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RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER





Steven M, Morgan, P.C. and Allison K. Obermann, Esq. *
I. INTRODUCTIONON July 16, 1991, U.S. District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer sentenced the
former owner of a waste disposal company in Garland, Texas to a
three-year prison term for dumping untreated industrial waste into
the Dallas sewer system. The former owner, Herman Goldfaden, also paid a
monetary penalty of $75,000, while his company received the maximum
$1,000,000 fine.' Asking for leniency, Goldfaden said "I'm a good man.
I've been good to my employees... [being in jail will hurt."'2 The judge
nevertheless imposed a sentence that, though harsh, is consistent with a
growing trend in criminal environmental cases. Furthermore, recent court
cases have shown that while the managerial behavior in this instance was
highly culpable, many corporate executives may face criminal liability
purely on the basis of their position in the company.
Enforcement of criminal liability for environmental crimes is on the rise.
In response to congressional encouragement, 3 as well as growing public pres-
sure, prosecutors are pursuing criminal indictments with increasing vigor.
1990 was a record year in terms of criminal indictments for environmental
crimes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) returned 134 indictments in 1990,
a 33% increase from 1989. Of those prosecuted, the greatest percentage
* Steven M. Morgan received his B.A. from Northwestern University and his Doctor of
Jurisprudence from Vanderbilt University School of Law. He is currently a Partner at Akin,
Gump, Hauer & Feld. Allison K. Obermann received her B.A. from Dartmouth College and
her Doctor of Jurisprudence from the University of Texas School of Law. She is currently an
Associate at Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. The authors gratefully acknowledge the significant
contributions made to this article by Joseph D. Batson.
1. Tracy Everbach, Man Gets 3-Year Term for Illegal Dumping, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 17, 1991, at 21A.
2. Id. at 22A.
3. James S. Lynch, The Criminal Provisions of RCRA: Should Strict Liability be Applied
to its Permit Requirement, 5 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 127, 129 (1989).
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(78%) were corporations and their managers. More significantly, the DOJ
has been achieving a 95% conviction rate for environmental prosecutions.4
Prosecution of environmental crimes is politically advantageous5 and
lacks many of the prosecutorial hurdles found outside the environmental
context. The labyrinth of regulation in this area, the persistent legal stan-
dard of strict liability in many laws, the vast array of reporting requirements,
and the lack of privilege with regard to most environmental information, all
combine to make the defense of a criminal environmental charge a difficult
endeavor.
In light of this trend, recent cases involving the responsible corporate of-
ficer doctrine are especially significant. This emerging theory of liability
holds a corporate officer liable for the acts of his or her employees and allows
juries to infer the requisite mens rea for environmental violations based on
that officer's position, responsibility, and authority in a company. Prosecu-
tors are employing the responsible corporate officer doctrine with greater
frequency, and the courts of appeals are interpreting the doctrine with vary-
ing degrees of stringency. Therefore, it is important that corporations under
the penumbra of environmental regulation keep abreast of these cases and
employ procedures designed to minimize their potential liability.
This Article examines the responsible corporate officer doctrine in the ever
expanding context of criminal environmental enforcement. It first discusses
the origins of the doctrine in the public welfare arena. The Article next
examines four of the most recent cases interpreting the doctrine. The Article
then discusses the significance of the responsible corporate officer doctrine in
light of federal sentencing guidelines which are producing more onerous
consequences for environmental criminals. Finally, the Article outlines pos-
sible methods to reduce the potential for criminal liability based upon a re-
cent DOJ policy statement.
II. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
A. Background: Drugs and Hand Grenades
The origins of the responsible corporate officer doctrine can be traced to
United States v. Dotterweich,6 a 1943 case arising under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), which prohibits the introduction
or delivery for introduction of any adulterated or misbranded drug into in-
terstate commerce. 7 Dotterweich is a seminal case on public welfare legisla-
tion, through which Congress sought to "touch phases of the lives and
health of people which, in the circumstances of modem industrialism, are
4. David Aufhauser et al., Environmental Crimes, 1990 Annual Report, 1990 A.B.A.
SEC. NAT'L RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. L. 211 (1990).
5. Steven L. Humphreys, Possible Legal Challenges to Prosecution of Environmental
Crime, 5 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 295, 302 (Aug. 1, 1990).
6. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
7. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, ch. 675 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
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largely beyond self-protection." The goal of the FDCA, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, was to "[put] the burden of acting at hazard upon a
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger." 9 Thus, for purposes of deterrence in an industry involving "illicit
and noxious articles," the Court reasoned that an executive standing in re-
sponsible relation to the public danger could be held criminally liable despite
the absence of any conscious fraud. The Court acknowledged the potential
hardship such public welfare statutes could impose on individuals lacking
any knowledge of the wrongdoing.' 0 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
potential hardship to a public that was "wholly helpless" in the face of a
hazardous industry outweighed the burden on those in a position to inform
themselves as to the laws restricting such commerce."
In Dotterweich the president and general manager of a pharmaceutical
company was convicted of a violation of the FDCA after his company
purchased drugs from manufacturers and shipped them, repacked under its
own label, in interstate commerce. The jury found Dotterweich guilty on
two counts of shipping misbranded drugs in interstate commerce and one
count of shipping an adulterated drug. 12 The Court rejected Dotterweich's
theory that his ignorance of any wrongdoing should immunize him from
liability.' 3 The Court held that the FDCA, being a public welfare statute,
dispensed with the elements of awareness or knowledge in the interest of
public safety.' 4
The Supreme Court revisited the FDCA and the Dotterweich decision in
1975.15 In United States v. Park the Court expanded strict liability for viola-
tions of the FDCA and imposed a standard of care on corporate officials in a
position to prevent or remedy such violations. Park, the president and chief
executive officer of a national food chain, pleaded not guilty to charges alleg-
ing rodent infestation at certain warehouses, a violation of the FDCA. Park
asserted that he had delegated authority for such matters to dependable sub-
ordinates, although there was also evidence that the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) had advised Park of unsanitary conditions at the warehouse.
The jury convicted Park on all counts, but the court of appeals reversed, and
held that while Dotterweich dispensed with the element of "awareness of
some wrongdoing" the Supreme Court had not construed the FDCA as dis-
pensing with the element of wrongful action. 16
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' argument that wrongful
action was an indispensable element of a conviction under the FDCA. 17 The
Court stressed that corporate officials who voluntarily assume positions of
8. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
9. Id. at 281.
10. Id. at 284.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 278.
13. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
16. Id. at 666 (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281).
17. Id. at 672.
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authority in business enterprises that affect the health and well-being of the
public that supports them should likewise assume the duties of foresight and
vigilance that the FDCA imposes upon them.18 In describing this duty of
care, the Court stated that "the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek
out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to
implement measures that will insure [sic] that violations will not occur."1 9
The Court affirmed the district court's jury instruction that directed that
Park's position in the corporate hierarchy could not suffice as the sole basis
for his conviction. 20 The Court, nevertheless, held that "the [g]overnment
establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to war-
rant a finding by the trier of facts that the defendant had, by reason of his
position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in
the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and
that he failed to do so. ' '21 Thus, Park recognizes that, in the context of
public welfare statutes, corporate executives are ultimately responsible for
violations of subordinates over whom they exert authority. Furthermore,
corporate officers work under the burden of a duty of vigilance to ensure that
violations do not occur.22
More significantly, the breadth of responsibility that often accompanies
the chairmanship of a large national corporation afforded Park but a meager
defense. The Court acknowledged the viability of an objective impossibility
defense.23 That is, corporate agents may raise the affirmative defense that
they were "powerless to prevent or correct the violation." 24 Various letters
from the FDA advising Park of sanitary deficiencies at the warehouses, how-
ever, easily defeated his objective impossibility defense. In addition, the
Court implied that such a defense would have to survive serious judicial
scrutiny in order to shield a corporate officer from liability under the FDCA,
since the deterrent characteristics of public welfare statutes are rooted in
"penal sanctions cast in rigorous terms."'25 Indeed, the legal tenet for which
scholars now routinely cite the Park decision is that responsible corporate
agents can incur vicarious criminal liability based solely on corporate bylaws
and that the objective impossibility defense offers sparse refuge. 26
The theoretical basis for the significant escalation in environmental prose-
cutions during the past ten years is rooted in the less stringent mens rea
requirement of public welfare offenses. The Supreme Court explained this
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Paris, 421 U.S. at 674-75.
21. Id. at 673-74.
22. Karen M. Hansen, "Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
987, 992 (1978).
23. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
24. Id. at 673.
25. Id.
26. Christopher Harris, Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste
Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations and Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203,
229 n.158 (1988).
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lower knowledge threshold in Liparota v. United States.27 Liparota provides
insight into the relationship courts have found between public welfare stat-
utes like the FDCA and environmental laws.
In Liparota the co-owner of a sandwich shop was indicted for illegally
acquiring and possessing food stamps, a statutory offense under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2024(b)(1). The issue before the Court concerned the degree of knowledge
the government had to prove on the part of the defendant. Did the defend-
ant violate the statute with an "evil-meaning mind," or would general intent
suffice? While articulating its rationale for holding that the statute requires
knowledge on the defendant's part that his conduct violated the statute, the
Court made a distinction that is highly indicative of public welfare reason-
ing. Even if Congress included knowledge as an element of a crime, "[i]n
most previous instances, Congress has rendered criminal a type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regula-
tion and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety."' 28 Refer-
ring to a firearms case, United States v. Freed,29 the Court reiterated its
holding in that case that the government did not have to prove that the
owner of unregistered hand grenades knew that the grenades were unregis-
tered to convict under a federal statute making it illegal to receive or possess
an unregistered firearm.30 In Freed the Court noted that "one would hardly
be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent
act." 3
1
As we shall see, corporate officials in industries regulated by environmen-
tal statutes would be wise to think of themselves as owners of hand grenades,
the shrapnel from which can readily pierce the corporate veil. Prior to the
recent series of cases employing the responsible corporate officer doctrine,
some writers speculated hopefully that the doctrine would not expand be-
yond statutes that do not require a showing of willfulness or intent.
32
Courts, however, have been quick to group toxic or hazardous materials in
the same category as drugs, firearms and hand grenades. 33 Environmental
statutes, like the FDCA, are being treated as public welfare statutes for
which a mere showing of general intent satisfies the knowledge requirement
and is not considered overly punitive when compared to the health and
safety risks hazardous substances clearly pose.34 As resort to the doctrine
27. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
28. Id at 433.
29. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
30. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
31. Id. (quoting Freed, 401 U.S. at 609).
32. Frederick W. Addison, III & Elizabeth E. Mack, Creating an Environmental Ethic in
Corporate America: The Big Stick of Jail Time, 44 Sw. L.J. 1427, 1435 (1991).
33. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65
(1971); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1143, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499,
1502-03 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
34. F. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforce-




becomes more frequent, the responsible corporate officer doctrine could af-
fect not only the midnight dumpers of the regulated community but lax or
inattentive executives responsible for compliance with the labyrinth of envi-
ronmental regulations as well.
B. Recent Cases Applying Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Recent cases relying on Dotterweich, Park, and to a lesser extent Liparota,
adopt the less burdensome theories of intent that often accompany public
welfare offenses. At least one court interpreting environmental laws under
the responsible corporate officer doctrine has read Park broadly, imposing
liability based almost solely on the officer's position in the corporate hierar-
chy.3 5 Others refuse to impose liability on the basis of the agent's position
alone, yet minimal circumstantial evidence in addition to the officer's posi-
tion within the corporation may nonetheless suffice. However courts inter-
pret it, the responsible corporate officer doctrine substantially eases a
prosecutor's burden and could prove problematic to all but the most vigilant
corporate officers.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Dee 36 has been one of the
more stringent applications of the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
The defendants in Dee were civilian engineers employed to develop chemical
warfare systems for the Army. Gepp, a chemical engineer, was responsible
for operations and maintenance at the facility. Dee and Lentz were Gepp's
superiors. As heads of their respective departments, the defendants were
responsible for ensuring that provisions of various company compliance poli-
cies, as well as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)37 re-
quirements, were fulfilled within their departments and that their
subordinates were aware and in compliance with those regulations. The dis-
trict court found all three guilty of multiple violations of RCRA for illegally
storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous waste. The district court sus-
pended each defendant's sentence and placed each defendant on three years
probation and 1,000 hours of community service.
On appeal, the defendants first asserted that they were immune from lia-
bility because of their status as federal employees at a federal facility. The
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that even where federal em-
ployees enjoy a degree of immunity for certain actions, there was no general
immunity from criminal liability for actions taken while in office. 38
The defendants next argued that they did not knowingly violate RCRA.
The defendants claimed that they did not know that violation of RCRA was
a crime and that they were unaware that the chemicals they managed were
hazardous. The court held that ignorance of the law is no defense and, more
specifically, that the government did not need to prove the defendants knew
35. See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 111 S. Ct. 1307, 113 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1991).
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
38. Dee, 912 F.2d at 744.
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violation of RCRA was a crime, nor that regulations existed which listed
and identified the chemical wastes as RCRA hazardous wastes.39 The court
stated that the government need only prove that the defendants knew of the
generally hazardous nature of the chemicals they were handling.4 Applying
the reasoning of public welfare statutes like the FDCA to RCRA, the court
stated that "where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products of ob-
noxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great
that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."
4
'
Defendant Gepp contended that there was insufficient evidence that he
directed the storage or disposal operations. He asserted that "[s]loppy stor-
age procedures is [sic] not a crime."'42 The court strongly disagreed, stating
"[n]egligent and inept storage of hazardous wastes is one of the evils RCRA
was designed to prevent, and § 6928(d) makes such egregious behavior a
crime."'43 The court found evidence that Gepp was in charge of operations
at the plant, had originally ordered placement of the hazardous chemicals in
a storage shed, had repeatedly ignored warnings about the hazardous condi-
tion of chemicals that were improperly stored, and had made no effort to
comply with RCRA regulations. The court found this evidence sufficient for
the imposition of criminal liability under RCRA.44
The next federal court to consider the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine rejected strict adherence to the doctrine by holding that a corporate
officer may not be held criminally liable under environmental laws solely
because his employees acted illegally.45 In United States v. White the court
held that neither RCRA nor the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act 46 allows a corporate officer to be held criminally liable unless he
or she knowingly participated in the illegal acts charged.
47
White involved allegations that waste pesticide materials, stored in an
evaporation tank at PureGro Inc., were illegally removed and sprayed on a
field. A PureGro corporate officer, Steven Steed, was charged with know-
ingly storing and disposing of hazardous waste without a permit by virtue of
his direct responsibility for all environmental safety matters at PureGro's
facilities and his oversight of its employees.
The court concluded, however, that the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine does not apply to crimes where the federal government must prove
criminal intent. To convict Steed, the court held that the government must
show that Steed had actual knowledge of the violations or aided and abetted
39. Id. at 745.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 745 (quoting International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 558).
42. Id. at 747.
43. Dee, 912 F.2d at 747.
44. Id. at 748.
45. United States v. White, No. CR-90-228-AAM, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5567 (E.D.
Wash. Mar. 28, 1991).
46. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
47. White, LEXIS 5567, at *26.
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the employees who committed the violations.48 The court concluded that
the fact that Steed should have known that violations would occur was not
enough to prove the degree of knowledge required to support a criminal
conviction. "[T]he government must prove not only knowing treatment,
storage or disposal of hazardous waste but also that the defendant knew the
waste was hazardous.
'49
The court's analysis in White is congruent with the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Johnson & Towers,50 where the Third Circuit held
that knowledge of every element of the crime is necessary for a conviction
under RCRA. 51 Scholars, however, have criticized the reasoning of Johnson
& Towers as being inconsistent with the congressional goal of promoting en-
forcement and compliance through the criminal provisions of RCRA. 52
Furthermore, the trend in the courts of appeals appears to be toward a find-
ing of criminal liability under environmental statutes based only upon proof
of general intent.5 3
The two most recent cases to employ the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine also illustrate that White may have been an aberrant decision. These
cases differ, however, in their interpretation of the degree to which an of-
ficer's position in a company can impute knowledge of a violation.
Just a month after the White decision, the Tenth Circuit issued what ap-
pears to be the broadest reading of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
thus far. In United States v. Brittain,5 4 a city public utilities director ap-
pealed his conviction for falsely reporting a material fact to a government
agency and discharging pollutants in violation of an NPDES permit. The
district court based its conviction on evidence that the plant supervisor of
the city's wastewater treatment plant had informed the defendant that dur-
ing heavy rains raw sewage was being diverted by a bypass pipe to an outfall
for which the facility did not have a permit. Evidence also showed that the
defendant twice witnessed such discharges and had instructed the plant su-
pervisor not to report the discharges to the EPA as required by the permit.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conviction and, after prefacing
its holding with summarizations of Dotterweich and Park, directly applied
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
51. Id. at 664-65.
52. Lynch, supra note 3, at 130. See also Andrea M. Fike, A Mens Rea Analysis for the
Criminal Provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 174,
185-87 (1987) (arguing that in interpreting the statute to require knowledge, the Johnson &
Towers court contravened the intent of Congress).
53. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1143, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1990) (rejecting Johnson & Towers and holding
that knowledge by defendant that city lacked relevant RCRA permit was not essential element
of crime); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that ignorance of the law is no defense in a heavily regulated industry and lack of knowledge
that a substance was not a hazardous waste within the meaning of the statute was an equally
ineffective defense).
54. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FDCA to the Clean Water Act."5
The court held that congressional intent was identical for both the FDCA
and the Clean Water Act in that "hardships suffered by 'responsible corpo-
rate officers' who are held criminally liable in spite of their lack of conscious
wrong-doing" are outweighed by the public welfare objectives of the stat-
ute.56 The court noted that section 1319(c)(3) of the Clean Water Act in-
cludes "any responsible corporate officer" in its definition of the term
"person" for purposes of criminal penalties. 57 The court interpreted this
additional definition as an expansion of liability under the Clean Water
Act.58 The court held that for a responsible corporate officer to be crimi-
nally liable under the Clean Water Act, he or she "would not have to will-
fully or negligently cause a permit violation. Instead, the willfulness or
negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by virtue of his position of
responsibility. ' 59
Brittain illustrates the responsible corporate officer doctrine in its most
inclusive form. The decision should set off alarms in corporate board rooms
within the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction. According to Brittain, criminal lia-
bility attaches purely by virtue of an officer's job description. The holding
may, however, be limited to statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act, which specifically designate responsible corporate officers as
liable parties in their criminal provisions.6° Direct evidence of the defend-
ant's highly culpable activity may also have influenced the court. The hold-
ing would nevertheless impose liability upon negligent officers with little or
no consciousness of wrong doing.
The most recent interpretation of the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine emanates from the First Circuit and somewhat moderates the reason-
ing of Brittain. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.61
provides one of the most moderate interpretations of the doctrine to date.
The case involved the president and two employees of a Rhode Island com-
pany who were all convicted under RCRA for knowingly transporting haz-
ardous waste to an unpermitted facility. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil
Co. (M&W) was in the business of transporting and disposing of waste oils
and contaminated soil. M&W transported toluene-contaminated soil to a
permitted facility that was authorized to accept liquid hazardous wastes and
soils contaminated with non-hazardous wastes for disposal. The permit did
not, however, authorize M&W to dispose of toluene-contaminated soil at the
facility.
The trial court instructed the jury that in addition to demonstrating that
the defendant had actual knowledge of the violation, the government could
55. Id. at 1419.
56. Id.
57. Id. (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988)).
58. Id.
59. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419.
60. See Federal Water Pollution and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 113(c)(6) (1988).
61. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
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establish the defendant's liability through showing that the defendant was a
responsible corporate officer of the corporation that had committed the vio-
lation. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to prove that the
defendant was a responsible corporate officer, the prosecution must satisfy
three elements: (1) that the defendant was an officer rather than an em-
ployee of the corporation; (2) that the officer had direct responsibility over
the activities that caused a violation; and (3) that the officer knew or believed
that a violation of the type alleged had actually occurred.
The First Circuit reversed the conviction of M&W's president on the basis
of the trial court's responsible corporate officer instruction. 62 The court
ruled that the instruction was improper because the third element did not
necessitate knowledge of the specific act contained in the indictment, but
simply asked whether the officer knew or erroneously believed that illegal
activity of the same type had occurred on another occasion. 63 The First
Circuit rejected the trial court's conclusion that proof that the defendant was
a responsible corporate officer under its three-part test conclusively estab-
lished the element of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of the act in
question." The court agreed with the government that relevant circumstan-
tial evidence could be used to infer knowledge. 65 The First Circuit neverthe-
less ordered a new trial because the instruction called for a mandatory
presumption of knowledge of facts constituting the offense based solely on
the defendant's official responsibility.66 The court refused to give its ap-
proval of a strict liability standard for environmental offenses.
The First Circuit could have upheld the conviction had the trial court
instructed the jury that it could infer the requisite knowledge on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. The court of appeals suggested that the trial court
could have elaborated on the extent to which the defendant's responsibilities
"might lead to the reasonable inference that he knew of the . . . transac-
tion."' 67 The First Circuit stated that knowledge could be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence, "including position and responsibility of defendants
such as corporate officers, as well as information provided to those defend-
ants on prior occasions."'68
That the First Circuit did not simply disapprove of the instruction but
ruled that it was reversible error is significant, because there appeared to be
sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the knowledge threshold via cir-
cumstantial evidence. The First Circuit took note of the prosecution's evi-
dence that the defendant was not only the president and owner of M&W but
was a hands-on manager of a relatively small firm. 69 There was also evi-
dence that the defendant had been informed by a consultant on two prior
62. Id. at 51.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 52.
66. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 52.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id. at 50.
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occasions that toluene-contaminated soil had been transported to the facility
by other companies and that such actions violated RCRA. The court appar-
ently wished to send an unequivocal message that proof that a defendant is a
responsible corporate officer will not suffice to conclusively establish the ele-
ment of knowledge expressly required under environmental statutes.70 The
First Circuit stated that "[i]n a crime having knowledge as an express ele-
ment, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is
not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of
knowledge." '7 1
Thus, the responsible corporate officer doctrine has received divergent
treatment by various courts of appeals. In Dee the Fourth Circuit required
some knowledge on the part of officers in charge of compliance procedures
of the generally hazardous nature of the materials with which they dealt. In
contrast, in Brittain the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the responsible cor-
porate officer doctrine comes close to imposing strict criminal liability for all
responsible corporate officers. Finally, in MacDonald the First Circuit
treated a defendant's position of authority as merely circumstantial evidence
of the defendant's knowledge of a violation. According to the First Circuit,
some additional evidence of culpability, or strong circumstantial evidence of
the defendant's actual responsibilities, must supplement mere proof of
authority.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is in the early stages of evolu-
tion in the environmental arena. Prosecutors did not begin to apply the doc-
trine to environmental violations until late 1990. Furthermore, case law will
continue to define the issues as prosecutions increase and prosecutors at-
tempt to persuade the courts on various forms of the doctrine. From a de-
fense standpoint, the MacDonald interpretation appears to be the most
favorable decision. The possibility remains, however, that the other circuits
could follow the reasoning in Brittain, which could mean jail time for corpo-
rate officers with no conscious knowledge of wrong doing.
III. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: No MORE SLAPS ON THE WRIST
In 1986 Michael A. Brown7 2 described the enforcement policy of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the DOJ as one
that "encourages the use of means such as persuasion, administrative action
and other alternatives before resorting to a court for formal, judicial ac-
tion."173 He described the EPA's enforcement policy at the time as one that
"[measured] enforcement effectiveness by compliance achieved as opposed to
cases referred."'74 Brown recognized however, that despite its stated policy
of cooperation, EPA press releases and press conferences indicated that the
70. Id. at 55.
71. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
72. Former Enforcement Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
73. Michael A. Brown, Enforcement and Liabilities, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 560, 561 (8th ed. 1985).
74. Id. at 562.
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agency was beginning to equate the success of its enforcement policy with a
litany of prosecution statistics.
Brown was prophetic. A recent memo from Joseph G. Block 75 reflects the
government's conspicuous publication of environmental criminal indict-
ments, convictions, penalties, and prison terms.76
Early sentences for criminal convictions of environmental crimes com-
monly involved suspended sentences, probation, and community service.
Enormous fines and significant prison terms were slow to emerge as the pri-
mary deterrents of environmental crimes. However, as the above statistics
indicate, monetary penalties are rapidly multiplying and actual confinement
for criminal violators is no longer a rarity.
The new agenda of prosecutors, which seeks to maximize the deterrent
effect of criminal sentences, is one reason prison terms may be rising. Prose-
cutors now seek to send a message not only to the flagrant industrial mid-
night dumpers but also to the corporate board rooms from where inadequate
environmental policies originate.77 Some writers also attribute the increase
of prosecutions to the political appeal of prosecuting rich, high profile,
75. Chief of Environmental Crimes Section, United States Department of Justice.
76.
Indictments Pleas/Convictions
FY 83 40 40
FY 84 43 32
FY 85 40 37
FY 86 94 67
FY 87 127 86
FY 88 124 63
FY 89 101 107
FY 90 134 85
FY 91 87 57
TOTAL 790 578
Fed. Penalties Imposed Prison Terms Actual Confinement
FY 83 $ 341,100 11 yrs. 5 yrs
FY 84 384,290 5 yrs. 3 mos. 1 yr. 7 mos.
FY 85 565,850 5 yrs. 5 mos. 2 yrs. 11 mos.
FY 86 1,917,602 124 yrs. 2 mos. 2 days 31 yrs. 4 mos. 12 days
FY 87 3,046,060 32 yrs. 4 mos. 7 days 14 yrs. 9 mos. 22 days
FY 88 7,091,876 39 yrs. 3 mos. 1 day 8 yrs. 3 mos. 7 days
FY 89 12,750,330 51 yrs. 25 mos. 36 yrs. 14 mos.
FY 90 29,977,508 71 yrs. 11 mos. 3 days 47 yrs. 13 mos. 1 day
FY 91 8,256,809 8 yrs. 16 mos. 8 yrs. 16 mos.
TOTAL $64,331,425 346 yrs. 69 mos. 13 days 152 yrs. 77 mos. 42 days
(351 yrs. 9 mos. 13 days) (158 yrs. 5 mos. 12 days)
Environmental Criminal Statistics FY83 through April 2, 1991, as cited in McColl, "Environ-
mental Criminal Law," presented to Environmental Section of the Dallas Bar Association
(July 25, 1991).
The total for FY 90 includes a $22 million forfeiture that was obtained in a RICO/mail
fraud case against three individuals and six related waste disposal and real estate development
companies. A major portion of this forfeiture is expected to be designated for hazardous waste
cleanup upon liquidation of assets. Included in the jail terms are two 12 year/7 month
sentences against two individuals in the same RICO/mail fraud case.
77. Allan R. Gold, Increasingly, a Prison Term is the Price Paid by Polluters, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15 1991, at Al.
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white-collar criminals.78
Aside from the dramatic increase in criminal convictions as well as
prosecutorial zeal, another reason for these harsher sentences can be attrib-
uted to judicial adherence to federal sentencing guidelines. The United
States Sentencing Commission, established as an independent agency within
the judicial branch in 1984, issued mandatory sentencing guidelines for indi-
viduals that went into effect on November 1, 1987. While drafting the guide-
lines, the United States Sentencing Commission paid special attention to
public animosity toward environmental offenders. Studies indicate Ameri-
cans rank pollution as one of the more morally reprehensible crimes. 79 As a
consequence, jail sentences are becoming more common for violators of envi-
ronmental statutes, even for first-time offenders.8 0
Factors that can result in an increased sentence under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines include:
(1) If the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous, or repetitive dis-
charge, release, or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance or pesti-
cide into the environment;
(2) If the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or seri-
ous bodily injury;
(3) If the offense resulted in the disruption of public utilities or evacu-
ation of a community, or if cleanup required a substantial expenditure;
(4) If the offense involved transportation, treatment, storage or dispo-
sal without a permit or in violation of a permit; and
(5) If a recordkeeping offense reflected an effort to conceal a substan-
tive environmental offense.
Recent cases illustrate the effect of the sentencing guidelines on criminal
environmental prosecutions. United States v. Wells Metal Finishing8 ' pro-
vides an example of a trial court increasing a sentence pursuant to federal
sentencing guidelines. Defendant Wells and his company were convicted on
nineteen counts of knowingly discharging excessive amounts of zinc and cya-
nide into a city sewer system in violation of the Clean Water Act. The dis-
trict court sentenced Wells to fifteen months in custody to be served
concurrently on each count and one year of supervisory release conditioned
upon payment of a $60,000 fine to the city.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding that: 1) the trial court was justified in
increasing the sentence based on evidence that the treatment plant spent
from $1,000-$10,000 a month to aerate the contaminated water caused by
the zinc and cyanide discharges; 2) the city's $60,000 fine for a permit viola-
tion was reasonably related to the offense; and 3) the payment of the fine was
an appropriate condition of the defendant's probation.8 2 The court of ap-
peals also rejected Wells' claim that the increased sentence was based on
78. Frank Friedman, Is This Job Worth It?, 8 THE ENVTL. F. 20, 24 (May/June 1991).
79. Habicht, supra note 34, at 10,485.
80. Gold, supra note 77 at BI0.
81. 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 57.
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evidence too general to support the charge.8 3 The court stated that even if
Wells had requested an evidentiary hearing on the alleged factual inaccura-
cies of the pre-sentencing investigation, it would be within the discretion of
the district court to deny such a request.84
In another recent case, United States v. Bogas,85 a court of appeals ordered
a lower court to increase an environmental sentence based on the sentencing
guidelines.86 In Bogas a municipal officer pled guilty to charges of failure to
report a release of hazardous substances and the making of false statements
to the EPA. The district court ruled that the defendant's crimes did not
require imprisonment. Instead, the defendant was sentenced to a combina-
tion of community service, probation, and home detention. The government
appealed the ruling, arguing for an increased sentence. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit agreed that the offense level ought to have been increased and re-
manded the case for resentencing.8 7
In Bogas the defendant was the commissioner of an airport who initiated a
cleanup where jet fuel additives, partially filled drums of bad paint, and sev-
eral drums of dirty solvents were buried on airport property. The defendant
denied that he was the one who had ordered the waste to be dumped into the
pit. The defendant, however, admitted deliberately misstating facts about
what had been buried in the pit. Although testing of the property proved
little to no soil or water contamination, the court found that the defendant
had violated CERCLA by failing to notify federal agencies of the release of
hazardous substances.88 The court also noted that the violation would re-
quire a substantial expenditure for the cleanup of over 100 drums that had
been buried at the airport.8 9 The court found these facts sufficient to remand
the case for increased punishment in accordance with sentencing
guidelines.90
In the Fifth Circuit, the court of appeals recently upheld the conviction
and sentence of a defendant, Sellers, who illegally transported and disposed
of hazardous wastes, including paint wastes and solvents, on an embankment
in a rural area of Mississippi. 9' The Fifth Circuit found that the trial court
properly applied the sentencing guidelines for violations of RCRA. The
court upheld the trial court's sentence that ordered Sellers to serve forty-one
months in prison and pay nearly $7,000 in restitution and court fees. 92
United States v. Paccione93 serves as a final example of the influence of
sentencing guidelines on environmental prosecutions and the seriousness of
the DOJ in its efforts to deter environmental crime with strict punishment.
83. Id. at 57-58.
84. Id.
85. 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990).
86. Id. at 366.
87. Id. at 369.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Bogus, 920 F.2d at 368-69.
91. United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 418.
93. 751 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Paccione involved the conviction and sentencing of the operators of an illegal
landfill and a transporter of medical waste in one of the largest frauds involv-
ing environmental crimes ever prosecuted in the United States. A conserva-
tive estimate of the value of the fraud was $35,000,000. Two of the
defendants operated an illegal landfill on Staten Island in New York City.
The operators, Vulpis and Paccione, engaged in illegal collection, transpor-
tation, and disposal of waste in violation of a permit, which they obtained
fraudulently. The court also found the defendants guilty of violations of
RICO and conspiring to violate RICO for defrauding the city and a pri-
vately owned landfill. 94 Paccione and a transporter, McDonald, were con-
victed of mail fraud stemming from fraudulent statements given to the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation in order to obtain a
permit to transport medical waste. 95
The district court sentenced the transporter, McDonald, to a twelve
month prison sentence plus a period of two years supervised release. Addi-
tionally, McDonald was fined over $250,000. The court found his punish-
ment to be justified partly because McDonald engaged in a complex scheme
that involved forging a document to obtain a permit and sending out hun-
dreds of letters to solicit business. 96 McDonald defrauded numerous genera-
tors into believing that their medical waste was being disposed of legally.
The district court sentenced the operators, Vulpis and Paccione, to 151
months imprisonment. The court believed the sentence to be justified be-
cause it found that the operator's fraudulent activity caused the loss of ap-
proximately $35,000,000. 9 7 The operators had continued to illegally dump
waste despite a restraining order prohibiting them from doing so, and the
operators played leadership roles in the dumping of illegal toxic substances.
Paccione differs from the aforementioned cases in that RICO and mail
fraud, rather than environmental statutes, were employed for the conviction.
The crimes of Vulpis, Paccione, and McDonald, however, were essentially
environmental violations, and the prosecutors' decision to try the case under
RICO and mail fraud probably had more to do with the stricter sentences
available under these causes of action rather than an actual characterization
of the crimes. The case demonstrates the enormity of fines and the length of
prison terms that can result when courts adhere to sentencing guidelines and
prosecutors vigorously pursue violators of environmental laws.
IV. AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY: DOJ POLICY STATEMENT
The EPA and the DOJ may measure the success of enforcement policies
by the number of prosecutions. However, while indictments seem foremost
on the EPA/DOJ agenda, prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to seek criminal prosecutions for environmental crimes. The
DOJ recently published a policy statement that outlines the various factors
94. Id. at 374.
95. Id. at 372.
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id. at 381.
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prosecutors may wish to consider when exercising their discretion in pursu-
ing criminal sanctions. 98 When deciding whether to prosecute environmen-
tal violations either civilly or criminally, most prosecutors will generally
look first to the criminal potential of the case. 99 Public sentiment against
environmental violators cannot be underestimated, yet prosecutors must also
consider the likelihood of indictment and convictions. Though public wel-
fare offenses carry a lesser prosecutorial burden, an attorney must neverthe-
less convince a jury of a corporate officer's moral blameworthiness. When
faced with tangible evidence of corporate good faith, the likelihood of a suc-
cessful conviction decreases. The DOJ introduces its policy statement as an
effort to encourage self-auditing, self-policing, and voluntary disclosure of
environmental violations by the regulated community1 0 In addition, the
DOJ acknowledges its own prosecutorial inclinations by stating that it does
not want such prosecutions to undermine critical self-auditing. The DOJ
designed the policy statement to promote consistency in the application of
civil and criminal sanctions and to provide the regulated community with "a
sense of how the federal government exercises its criminal prosecutorial dis-
cretion." 01 After examining the various factors included in the guidelines,
it appears that intensive self-scrutiny is no longer merely a corporate option
based on fiscal considerations. Self-policing is now the key means by which
corporations can help to ensure that regulatory violations remain in a civil
context.
A. Voluntary Disclosure
The policy statement notes that voluntary, timely, and complete disclo-
sure is the first factor a prosecuting attorney will consider when exercising
prosecutorial discretion. 0 2 Foremost in importance to the prosecutor's de-
cision will be whether a violator 10 3 came forward before the EPA com-
menced any investigation, whether law enforcement or regulatory
authorities were already aware of the violations, or whether disclosure is
already required by law, regulation or permit.'°4 Essentially, the DOJ wants
regulated entities to come forward before the regulatory agencies are aware
of a violation. Given the present atmosphere of increased civil and criminal
penalties assessed against violators, it may be unrealistic to expect persons to
alert the agencies to their violations in all instances. The policy statement,
however, reminds the regulated community that delinquent or reluctant ad-
98. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmen-
tal Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the
Violator, United States Department of Justice (1991) [hereinafter DOJ Policy].
99. Habicht, supra note 34, at 10,481.
100. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 1.
101. Id. at 1-2.
102. Id. at 3.
103. The DOJ indicates that for the purposes of the policy statement, the terms "person"
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missions will be considered an aggravating factor in applying prosecutorial
discretion.
The policy statement notes that the prosecutor should also consider the
quality and quantity of the information provided. Therefore, while disclo-
sure of a violation may be required, good faith and candor on the part of the
violator should factor into the prosecuting attorney's decision.
B. Cooperation
This section of the policy statement reiterates the basic tenents of the pro-
vision on voluntary disclosures. The policy statement directs that the prose-
cutor should consider not only the timeliness of a person's disclosure but the
promptness of the person's cooperation as well. Readily making the com-
plete results of internal audits, investigations, and potential witnesses avail-
able to investigators will reflect favorably upon potential criminal
defendants. 10 5
C. Preventive Measures and Compliance Programs
The existence or implementation of a comprehensive self-auditing pro-
gram is the third major factor that should weigh into a prosecutor's decision
to seek criminal sanctions, according to the policy statement.1°6 The policy
statement notes that environmental compliance policies and information sys-
tems are generally standard in most environmentally regulated industries
and should be constantly re-evaluated. Prosecutors will pay particular at-
tention to whether corporate policies were implemented in good faith and in
a timely manner. The notion that ex post facto compliance measures imple-
mented after serious violations have already come to light will reflect less
favorably on a business than programs initiated before a compliance problem
arose is implicit in the policy statement. Likewise, half-hearted attempts at
implementing a program with insufficient budgeting and minimal efforts at
promulgating the program on an institution wide basis may even be consid-
ered aggravating circumstances in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Half-hearted programs may imply a lack of candor on the part of the corpo-
ration, which will almost always lead to a criminal prosecution. 0 7
Specific questions the policy statement directs prosecutors to consider
when evaluating mitigating factors that attach to compliance programs
include:
Was there was a strong institutional policy to comply with all environ-
mental requirements? Had safeguards beyond those required by ex-
isting law been developed and implemented to prevent noncompliance
from occurring? Were there regular procedures, including internal or
external compliance and management audits, to evaluate, detect, pre-
vent, and remedy circumstances like those that led to the noncompli-
ance? Were there procedures and safeguards to ensure the integrity of
105. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 4.
106. Id.
107. Habicht, supra note 34, at 10,481.
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any audit conducted? Did the audit evaluate all sources of pollution
(i.e., all media), including the possibility of cross-media transfers of pol-
lutants? Were the auditor's recommendations implemented in a timely
fashion? Were adequate resources committed to the auditing program
and to implementing its recommendations? Was environmental compli-
ance a standard by which employee and corporate departmental per-
formance was judged? 08
Clearly, only the adoption of policies that reflect a thorough commitment to
environmental stewardship will induce leniency from the DOJ. The Depart-
ment's primary targets are midnight dumpers and unscrupulous executives
who cut corners at the expense of public health or put the environment in
jeopardy. Serious compliance policies will serve to distinguish between con-
scientious corporate agents and those who truly merit treatment as
criminals.
D. Additional Factors Which May Be Relevant
Three additional factors listed in the policy statement will have either a
positive or negative effect on a prosecutor's decision. The prosecutor will
look to the pervasiveness of the noncompliance, taking the "obviousness,
seriousness, duration, history, and frequency" of such violations into ac-
count. 109 This section states that "noncompliance may indicate systemic or
repeated participation in or condonation of criminal behavior." 0 Such a
finding, when combined with evidence of an officer's position of authority in
a company, could provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to impose indi-
vidual criminal liability. Such a finding could also be used to rebut a defend-
ant's assertions of employing good faith compliance procedures. Such
programs would be considered unreliable if they failed to remedy repeated
violations.
The policy statement also places significant importance on the existence of
"effective internal disciplinary action.""' The purpose of this factor is to
encourage effective communication of a company's environmental policies to
middle and lower level employees. The prosecutor will look for effective
mechanisms by which a company creates awareness on the part of employees
that environmental violations will not be condoned." 1 2 A policy of perks or
rewards for employees who report regulatory violations and potential envi-
ronmental risks might serve as a more positive means of achieving such
awareness. Corporate officers should consider low level employees as their
front line against environmental prosecution. For while executives formu-
late environmental policies, it is the floor managers and truck drivers who
can break the laws that send executives to jail. Any executive with remote
responsibility for environmental matters should don a hard-hat and walk the
floor with those who must deal with compliance on a daily basis.
108. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 4-5.
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Finally, the policy statement directs the prosecutor to consider "the extent
of any efforts to remedy any ongoing noncompliance." ' 13 A prosecutor will
favorably view those companies which act promptly and thoroughly to elim-
inate any noncompliance and cooperate fully with federal and state authori-
ties to reach compliance agreements.11 4
E. DOJ Hypotheticals: The Best and Worst Scenarios
In addition to the guidelines outlined above, the Justice Department has
provided several hypotheticals that are intended to illustrate the operation of
the guidelines contained in the policy statement. The first hypothetical pro-
vides a model situation in which prosecutors should exercise leniency. In
the first hypothetical, Company A discovers that some of its employees are
illegally disposing of hazardous wastes during a regularly conducted com-
prehensive environmental audit. An internal company investigation con-
firms the audit information, at which time Company A discloses all
pertinent information to the appropriate government agency, undertakes
compliance planning with the agency, and begins appropriate remediation.
Company A also corrects any false information previously submitted to the
agency. Company A disciplines the employees involved in the violations,
including any responsible supervisors and provides the agency with the
names of the employees responsible for the violations. Finally, Company A
reviews its environmental compliance program and corrects the weaknesses
that allowed a violation to occur. Under these circumstances, the policy
statement states that Company A stands a good chance of receiving
prosecutorial leniency. 115
At the opposite end of the spectrum is Company Z, portrayed in the sec-
ond hypothetical. Company Z has a compliance program in theory but
makes no effort to disseminate its content, train employees in its application,
or oversee its implementation. Company Z fears that an employee may re-
port environmental violations to the government. Faced with this threat,
Company Z undertakes an environmental audit focusing only upon the par-
ticular violation and ignoring the possibility of other violations. Company Z
reports the violation to the government, but makes no effort to negotiate
with regulators regarding its violations. Company Z resists performing re-
medial work and refuses to pay monetary penalties. Company Z also fails to
correct false information that has been submitted to regulatory agencies and
makes no effort to strengthen its internal compliance procedures. Finally,
Company Z refuses to cooperate with prosecutors in identifying employees
responsible for the violations and resists disclosure of any documents related
to the violations or the responsible employees. In these circumstances, the
policy statement warns that leniency is unlikely. The policy statement notes
that where Company Z has demonstrated no good faith efforts to address
violations or punish responsible employees, criminal prosecution may be
113. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 5.
114. Id. at 6.




A broad range of possibilities exist between the two extreme hypotheticals
in which a prosecutor could exercise leniency, according to the policy state-
ment. 117 Some examples include a situation similar to Company A's, except
that the company performs a limited audit as an effort to avoid prosecution.
The policy statement notes that this situation may give rise to prosecution of
a lesser charge or a decision to prosecute the individuals rather than the
company.' 18 Additionally, the policy statement points out that where a
company refuses to reveal any information regarding individual violators,
the likelihood of criminal prosecution of the company substantially
increases. 119
In another example, a company conducts an environmental audit and cor-
rects discovered violations without informing the government of the viola-
tions. The policy statement notes that under certain statutes, such as the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA),120 failure to report is a felony itself.121 The policy statement
also points out that companies that report violations may be adversely af-
fected by those that do not because the companies that do report violations
may have their emissions or discharges decreased while the unreported vio-
lator's remain unchanged.122 Additionally, the guidelines state that failure
to report undermines the effectiveness of the regulatory system.' 23 For all
the foregoing reasons, the policy statement warns that criminal prosecution
of a company guilty of nonreporting is likely. 124
The policy statement states that mitigating efforts on the part of a com-
pany will be recognized and evaluated in all cases. 125 Additionally, the pol-
icy statement notes that the greater the showing of good faith, the more
likely the prosecutor is to exercise leniency. Ultimately, however, the policy
statement notes that the decision to prosecute rests entirely with the prose-
cutor and that the guidelines explained above are intended only as internal
guidance to attorneys at the DOJ.126 The policy statement may not be used
to establish any legally enforceable right or benefit. 127
The DOJ policy statement illustrates that strict adherence to reporting
and permit requirements and absolute candor in communications with regu-
latory agencies remain the best defenses against criminal environmental lia-
bility. Voluntary compliance and disclosure efforts may be overshadowed by
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 10.
119. Id. at 11.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
121. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 12. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(5) (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988).
122. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 12.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id.
127. DOJ Policy, supra note 98, at 14-15.
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the EPA and the DOJ forecasts of ever increasing environmental prosecu-
tions. Nevertheless, good faith compliance efforts and tangible evidence of a
good attitude appear to be a corporate officer's best hope in avoiding crimi-
nal environmental prosecution. If vigorous compliance efforts do not en-
tirely immunize corporations from criminal liability, they will at least serve
as an effective form of damage control when a judge considers increasing a
sentence based on federal sentencing guidelines.
V. CONCLUSION
The responsible corporate officer doctrine, with its origins firmly rooted in
public welfare legislation, appears to be emerging as a viable theory of liabil-
ity in the environmental context. The divergence of court opinion on the
doctrine's application to environmental crimes has created an uncertainty
and potential for liability of which corporate officers should be aware.
Concurrent with the emergence of the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine in the environmental context is the increasing adherence by courts to
federal sentencing guidelines. Strict compliance with the sentencing guide-
lines signals an end to probation, community service, and suspended
sentences and the dawning of an era where corporate officers face significant
jail fines for violations of environmental laws.
In an atmosphere of greater potential for liability and increased prosecu-
tion and sentencing, adoption and implementation of programs of voluntary
compliance and disclosure may be difficult steps for the corporate officer.
The recent DOJ policy statement, however, illustrates the notion that good
faith compliance efforts and absolute candor in communications with regula-
tory agencies will be rewarded by prosecutorial leniency. Given the enor-
mity of the regulated community, it appears that voluntary, good faith
reporting and compliance will continue to be the cornerstone of any national
environmental program. Corporations and corporate officers should take
advantage of the cooperation and compliance route to avoid potential crimi-
nal liability.
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